Showing posts with label Mark-To-Market. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mark-To-Market. Show all posts

Thursday, April 2, 2009

Mark-to-Market - No Change of Opinion

I was absolutely floored by the activity generated by the mark-to-market changes today, so I went back and re-read the proposals. I'm not getting it - there really isn't any significant change in the proposals. Really, there isn't.

Now someone will come back and say that everyone else is saying that it's going to allow the evil banks to mark their positions to some fantasy level - but, they already are. You can't mark these things up any higher than 100%!

This ultimately changes nothing. The relatively insignificant changes it makes to where you can bucket your loss is just another thing you need to analyze (discount) before you invest in the company in question.

The market is dying for good news...

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Toxic Asset Marks?

If Goldman is right (not necessarily the case), the average carrying value for banks on Comm. Mortgages is just 95%. Surprisingly, C&I loans is even HIGHER at 96%. BAC, for example, is carrying Comm. Mortgages at 100%!, so is Citi!

Hotel Tango ZeroHedge.blogspot.com - go check out his site for the chart

Thursday, March 19, 2009

Mark to Market Changes

I'm very interested in other folks' opinions on these, but I do not see the level of changes required to make the market snap back for CMBS. They use a CDO in one of the examples, and that may be a different story, but nothing I see in the proposed revisions help CMBS without some less-than-truthful presumptions made by the reporting entities.

At the risk of making our readers dumberer, Jonathan Weil, of Bloomberg, believes the proposed changes will create an STD-ridden cathouse (his analogy) out of the market, but most of the points he highlights are not changes - they're part of the current rules. His example hiding losses on stock holdings of AIG (Average Daily Volume: 80+ million shares) and Fannie Mae (Average Daily Volume: 20 million shares) fails both tests in both the current and proposed set of rules, and companies would still have to report these losses as usual.

Mr. Weil also notes that two members of the panel "opposed" the changes. In reality, the "opposing" proposal was also included in the FSP as an alternative view. They actually agree with the FSP 157-e in regards to determing whether or not a market is active and a transaction is distressed. The big difference in their argument is that A) FASB should work with IASB and come up with a joint agreement to avoid accounting arbitrage, and B) Other-than-temporary impairements should be reflected as an unrealized loss to earnings.

Outside of the journalistic bubble, market particpants realize that FASB's fair value accounting standards are obviously broken (and were broken when they were created). The current environment has highlighted the problem. I don't think it's fair to say FAS 157 created the current problems, but it is contributing to them. I'm biased towards CMBS, so its easy to walk over to the loan trading desk and look at a pool of senior mortgages trading at 80 cents on the dollar, and then walk over to the CMBS desk and see a pool of mortgages with a CUSIP attached (but otherwise identical) trading at sub 50 cents... well, something is wrong there. The 80 cent pool is being priced with some credit concern factored in, and the CUSIP'd pool is factoring credit concerns, but is mostly factoring in liquidity concerns. If you plan to hold both until they mature in 8 years, why should you price them differently?

He probably isn't a fan of "Secret Diary of a Call Girl" either


Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Mark-to-market FSPs released today

FSPs are the "FASB Staff Position" on proposals. They have some initial guidance and proposals, and allow for feedback from the market.

Here's the one on FAS 157-e and here is the one on the related 115-e, 124-e and EITF 99-20b.

I'm not sure if CMBS makes the cut based on the factors their using to determine a non-existent market place (in FAS 157-e). CMBS are actively traded, and bid-ask spreads aren't really that wide (their pretty narrow at the AAA level) relatively speaking. Although you can get widely disperse pricing on comparable bonds from EJV or whatever pricing service you use, you get close to the same answer if you go to Barcleh or BancOfAmerillwide - and they price the entire market every day for their indices. The only factor that CMBS seems to qualify for is the "Abnormal liquidity risk premiums... blah blah ... compared to reasonable estimates".

The other docs really don't seem to effect CMBS differently than they have in the past. They both note that if management does not anticipate selling the security before recovery, and using reasonable estimates... type of language. I need to read through them in more detail, and I'll post an update if I get any more out of it.