Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Water Tower Place refis, some bondholders lose

Former Rouse, GGP Mall in Chicago. This was the typical GGP mall with a high DSCR, low leverage (relatively speaking) and good tenants (again, relatively speaking. Matured 9/2010, but they were able to refinance the $131.5mm pari passu CMBS note on 9/28 with a new $200mm loan from Met Life according to Crain's (sorry no link).

The loan was permitted to get mezzanine financing, but frankly I don't know if it did. Regardless, it definitely refinanced into a substantially larger loan giving proceeds back to GGP. It's a little frustrating that bond holders had to eat a $1.2mm loss as both Trusts were charged substantial fees.

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

WFCM 2010-C1 - $735mm

Presale and Structure are out (10/22), talk out 10/26

Class Fitch/MDYs Size ($mm) WAL (yrs) C/E Talk
A-1 AAA/Aaa 162.00 5.05 17.80 +125
A-2 AAA/Aaa 443.25 9.71 17.80 +135
B AA/Aa2 22.08 9.91 14.80 +230
C A/A2 31.28 9.91 10.50 +300
D BBB/Baa3 34.03 9.93 5.90 +400
E Ba2/BBB- 13.80
4.00
F B2/B 12.88
2.25
G NR/NR 16.56
0.00
X-A AAA/Aaa 605.25


X-B NR/Aaa 130.62




UPDATED: As soon as I said "no talk yet", it trickled out.

This is basically a Fusion-Lite deal with 37 loans (59 props) and an average loan size of $19mm (max=185mm, min=3.3mm, Top10=64%).

BALL 2010-HLTN ($2.664bln)

Old Hilton collateral being securitized. Structure is one pass-through note $2.664bln offered ($406mm non-offered interests), 2.86 WAL, 4.54 fully-extended WAL, L+175 coupon.

You'll recall that the toal debt is a whopping $20.6 billion (orig face, $19.256 outstanding) from the $25 billion buyout by Blackstone at the peak. This consists of a nearly $9 billion senior mortgage ($2.664 of which is going in this BALL 2010-HLTN deal), and then another $10 billion-ish of mezzanine debt (9 tranches) and unsecured debt ($666mm). The debt was restructured some, including the retirement of $1.79billion of mezz debt - total outstanding today = $17.4mm. There's also another couple-to-three billion of subordinate loans.

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Multiple New Issue - WFCM 2010-C1 ($735mm); Hilton; Extended Stay

WFCM 2010-C1 ($735mm) was announced today - first issue off the new shelf for Wells. Collateral is 37 loan, 59 properties, 43.5% BOA, 43% WF, 13.4% Basis RE Cap 2. More to come...

Also, the WSJ reported today that the two largest Hotel CMBS clusterf*cks are coming back with new issues.

Hilton is purportedly first in line with $3bln (this is original debt, still on BOA & GS books).

Extended Stay is then expected out with $2bln before November to partly fund the $3.9bln buyout by Centerbridge/Paulson/Blackstone.

Monday, October 18, 2010

ProLogis selling top tier properties to Blackstone

Bloomberg reported that ProLogis is selling some of its best properties to Blackstone in a $1.02billion sale that includes 180 industrial properties, 3 stakes in real estate funds, and a minority stake in the Hilton New Orleans Riverside Hotel - to close in mid-November.

Villas Parkmerced - CD 2006-CD2 - $550mm

This month's remit reports a 4 month extension until 2/15/2011 (because things will be better then), and notes that Fortress has acquired the mezz (please note the exact structure isn't clear to us, and at least part of it looks like it is in two CRE CDOs) and a controlling interest in the borrower.

An additional $5mm is being plowed into a reserve, but looks like it will be eaten into heavily by fees, and accrued defaulted interest will be deferred until the extension date.

One Federal Street - $262mm in LBUBS 2006-C4

Tishman Speyer retired $62.5mm of mezz debt on One Federal Street according to CRE Direct, leaving it with a 49.5mm mezz note and a 262mm senior mortgage.

Saturday, October 9, 2010

And the Real Winner is...

We called it to soon back in March. The Centerbridge/Paulson/Blackstone investor group swooped in to take Extended Stay out of bankruptcy, quashing the creditor-approved group led by Starwood. More details to come.

There was one bit of unintended humor highlighted in the WSJ report on the matter:
Judge James Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan initially approved Extended Stay's Chapter 11 restructuring plan in July, calling it "perhaps an unprecedented bankruptcy" involving entities "never expected" to file for bankruptcy protection.

I think it's fair to say that a lot of people expected this deal to fail - it epitomizes the rise and fall of the CRE space and Hotels in particular. Blackstone put $3-$4 billion into buying it in 2005, then flipped it to Lightstone in a highly levered $8 billion transaction in 2007, and now they're taking it back.

Friday, October 8, 2010

Blackstone Targets Columbia Sussex

Bloomberg reported today that Blackstone has bought the junior debt associated with the Columbia Sussex portfolio in BSCMS 2006-BBA7.

The irony being that Blackstone sold those hotels to Columbia Sussex at the peak, and is now stealing them back at the trough...

Thursday, October 7, 2010

JPMCC 2010-C2 $1.1bln Priced?

This deal purportedly priced very tight today, but I frankly didn't see it and don't even know the actual name - some help would be greatly appreciated...

The A3 priced at+150 (25 wider than the last LCF AAA) per Bloomberg, and the WSJ quotes Merrill's former, and Barclays' current, CMBS analyst Julia Tcherkassova that the collateral is mostly maturing loans from outstanding CMBS deals.

ClassS&P/FitchSize ($MM)WALSubordination
A-1AAA/AAA$266.70 4.2718.25%
A-2AAA/AAA$243.10 7.1818.25%
A-3AAA/AAA$390.50 9.7918.25%
BAA/AA$37.20 9.8914.88%
CA/A$53.70 9.9110.00%
DBBB+/BBB+$33.00 9.977.00%


Bloomberg also notes that
Deutsche Bank AG plans to sell $856.6 million of bonds backed by commercial mortgages, a person familiar with the offering said today. The securities are tied to 42 loans secured by 63 properties, said the person, who declined to be identified because terms aren’t public.


I did some digging and see a JPMCC 2010-CNTR ($485) from JPM on 9/13 - what was this?

Monday, October 4, 2010

John Hancock Tower flipped, again

WSJ reports:
Boston Properties Inc. agreed to acquire the John Hancock Tower and Garage in Boston from private-equity firms Normandy Real Estate Partners and Five Mile Capital Partners for about $289.5 million, plus the assumption of about $640.5 million in debt.



Timeline
2006 - Broadway acquires from Beacon using $640mm Senior and a $723mm mezz.; Appraises at $1.3mm
2009 - Borrower defaults, Normandy and Five Mile pick up the mezz for $20.1mm, assume the senior, takeover ownership.
2010 - Normandy and Five Mile make 10x their investment less than 1.5 years later.

Good for GG9.

Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Regulators break the law, violated firms have to apologize

Really it is not that big a deal - customer data was illegally distributed to an attorney by regulators and nothing will ever come of it that would impact customers. However, the WSJ reports that the Alabama Securities Commission obtained confidential customer information related to their investigation into Morgan Keegan's own personal subprime debacle. When an attorney who is suing Morgan Keegan requested unrelated data from the ASC, they went ahead and just sent him 14,000 clients, names, social security numbers, etc.

So, Morgan Keegan was required by law to give up the information, and then the ASC broke the law by disseminating, even if it was unintentional, and finally Morgan Keegan has to foot the bill for notifying customers, setting up credit monitoring, etc. Morgan Keegan may be a bad guy here in the big picture, but the regulators continue to violate their duties and public trust in a big way with no repercussions. After Madoff, there should have been public lynchings - where is the outrage - we don't need new laws, we need new deputies!

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

More than $3 billion in Loan Sales Coming...

Also on the CRENews website, from last week:


Since the beginning of September, loan-sales advisers have taken offers on some $1.5 billion of loans that they have been marketing on behalf of their bank, special servicer and government-agency clients. And the expectation is that substantially more loans - as much as $3 billion or more - will be offered in the coming weeks.

...
Among special servicers, LNR Partners, CWCapital Asset Management, C-III Asset Management and Midland Loan Services are each said to be preparing the sale of loans.

LNR will be offering $200 million of hotel loans through Jones Lang LaSalle and another $100 million of small-balance hotel loans through an auction venture of JLL and REDC. It will also be offering roughly $150 million of additional loans through DebtX.

Earlier this year, it [LNR] orchestrated the sale of a $1 billion portfolio that was comprised largely of small-balance loans. Those loans were sold through Eastdil Secured to four investor groups. But instead of going the bulk-sales route this time around, the Miami company is looking to sell loans individually.

CWCapital, meanwhile, will take bids for $207 million of loans later this month through Mission Capital. It has also offered loans through CB Richard Ellis and Eastdil.


The very excellent article goes on to list a number of other coming sales from banks including M&I, BB&T, KBW (for a third party) together are expected to sell another $2-3 billion in portfolio loans.

As previously noted, everyone was waiting to see how these late summer CMBS sales ($1.5 to $2 billion was CMBS loans via Eastdil and Mission Capital) went in order to judge what to do with the other $80 or so billion on special servicers' desks. At the end of the day, the big $1.04bln LNR package of small balance CMBS loans exceed expectations and were mostly bought up by a large financial institution and financed by another large financial institution (both household names) at higher than expected prices.

I don't know what that does to the market - so many buyers have to deploy capital or lose it, so maybe they acquiesce now that a high watermark has been set and they just keep bidding up prices. Surely sellers like the execution and will start flooding the market just as Orest Mandzy notes in the above article.

At the very least CMBS credit IO holders should probably start shortening their expected workout periods on the aged REOs. The LNR sale was officially announced on 4/29/2010 (there were some early looks in mid-April) and the losses were reflected on the loans on 7/21/2010. That seems pretty quick to me.

Wells Fargo/Principal teaming up again

Wells has both been hiring and originating in recent months to come to market with a deal, one would presume, in the not-so-distant future. Earlier today Bloomberg had a story linked to CRENews (subscription required) that Principal was coming back and would originate deals for the new Wells shelf.

Historically Principal and Wells, pre-Wachovia, co-contributed to the PWR, TOP, and IQ brands.

NY Appeals Court denies Ackman's request to stay the 10/4 foreclosure on PCV/ST

Thursday, September 23, 2010

MBS Investor Database

Talcott's basement smells and he created a database to track MBS investors:

This year, the former partner at lobbying firm Patton Boggs LLP also found a unique solution to an even bigger housing problem: getting money back for investors in residential mortgage-backed securities that went bad. Franklin created a clearing house where investors can pool claims and potentially create the necessary legal clout to force mortgage lenders to buy back improperly made loans at the heart of the securities.

Before Franklin’s innovation, investors in such securities had no way of knowing who other investors were. Franklin’s approach may cost banks such as Bank of America Corp. billions of dollars. Lenders can be required to buy back securitized mortgages if they misrepresented their quality.


Can't you see the vast majority of the investors just using PHDC in Bloomberg (the article is written by Bloomberg) or use one of the other data providers?

JPMCC 2010-C2 $1.1bln

Class S&P/Fitch Size ($MM) WAL Subordination
A-1 AAA/AAA $266.70 4.27 18.25%
A-2 AAA/AAA $243.10 7.18 18.25%
A-3 AAA/AAA $390.50 9.79 18.25%
B AA/AA $37.20 9.89 14.88%
C A/A $53.70 9.91 10.00%
D BBB+/BBB+ $33.00 9.97 7.00%

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Former Kemsley buildings trade

NYPost reports that


Invesco has stepped up to the plate to win 100 Fifth Ave. for $93.5 million, while 183 Madison is going to Peter Armstrong's Rigby Asset Management with his partner, the Argentinean fund IRSA, for $75 million.

Pricing for 183 Madison on the southeast corner of 34th Street came in at $305 for 246,000 feet, while 100 Fifth's 258,000 square feet in the Union Square area ratcheted a bit higher at $360 a foot.


These are the buildings formerly owned by Paul Kemsley's Rock & HBOS and have been in receivership (PwC) for at least a year. PK also went long Lehman after it went bust and most recently bought the NY Cosmos (soccer).

The Queen is dead! Long live the Queen!

Younan refiedYounan Plaza with 70% LTV CMBS loan and a ~5% coupon.

With a loan maturity looming, Younan Properties has refinanced 4041 Younan Plaza, a 20-story, 405,693-square-foot office building located in downtown. The Woodland Hills, CA-based owner obtained the five-year, fixed-rate loan through a new conduit program with Deutsche Bank and used the proceeds to buy out the class A office tower’s largest investor.
...
“We were surprised by the availability and the terms of the CMBS loan,” Younan admits, adding that the new conduit loan provided 70% LTV and an interest rate near 5%. “We did not know CMBS was active because these days you’re not sure of anything. We learned that CMBS is coming back to life, and that a lot of banks are originating and able to package them.”

Rialto adds $7.7mm to LNRs bottom line

Distressed Debt Report:

Miami-based Lennar Corp. posted a profit for its fiscal quarter ending Aug. 31, thanks in part to the work of Rialto Investments, its division dedicated to acquiring distressed assets.

In February, Rialto teamed up with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. to acquire a 40% equity interest in 5,500 loans that had been originated by two dozen banks seized by the federal government. Rialto paid $243 million for its share of the loans.

Tuesday, September 21, 2010

August 2010 Delinquencies up 1/2 billion to $61.4 billion

Realpoint came out with their August numbers. This is substantially faster than the June to July change of $387.9billion.

Balance of 90+ day delinquent loans declined (first decline since we started down this rabbit hole), every other bucket increased.

Total Realpoint Delinquency Level - 8.14%
sans Agency -- 8.48%
Conduit/Fusion - 8.61%


They reference the pipeline of problem loans too. All brand name loans typical of '06 and '07: EOP, ESH, PCV/ST, Beacon & Seattle, Farallon MHC, and CNL Hotels & Resorts. (That's 3 pari passu loans now)

Average Loss Severity in August - 62%. They have a nice breakout at the end regarding losses if you want some references.

Their report is free - realpoint.com.

Saturday, September 18, 2010

No Problems at Fannie & Freddie due to Multifamily?

The Wall Street Transcript had an interview with Michael Levy titled "CMBS Risk Even Fannie And Freddie Would Not Underwrite" that got picked up by a few outlets. They kind of glaze over some of the facts and imply that the Enterprises (or Agencies, whatever you want to call them) are not exposed to the multifamily in CMBS?!? Obviously, we all know that there was a directed tranche (A1A) in every Conduit deal that contained all the Multifamily loans, and it was solely purchased by Freddie and Fannie.

The fact they skip this little factoid makes you question the entire article.

A good example of that would be Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town - that was something that the agencies wouldn't issue a traditional mortgage for because it was underwritten with very little equity and at a relatively low debt service coverage ratio. That's really the prime example of where an apartment operator wouldn't go to Fannie and Freddie to get a mortgage at the peak of the market because they couldn't, because it didn't meet Fannie and Freddie underwriting standards. So they went to the CMBS market, and that's why, in my opinion, to some degree apartment CMBS has had weaker performance than non-apartment CMBS debt.


Uh, all the current problems aside, and even realizing that many (most) questioned the viability of the sub-1% cap rate trade of PCV/ST, the original LTV was something like 54% on the senior debt in question. That was not the issue. Further, guess who is exposed directly to the senior mortgage of PCV/ST, wait for it, wait for ... Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, of course. They bought up the A1A notes on the CMBS deals that contain the mortgage.

So, let's leave aside their multifamily "portfolio" lending for a second and focus on their CMBS-like exposure. Freddie has a multifamily shelf called FHLMC Multifamily Structured Pass Through Certificates, off which they've issued $7.7 billion since late 2006, with $6.6 billion of that done since the crisis began (they just closed a deal this week run by BankofAmerillwide). Fannie has their DUS program (Delegated Underwriting and Servicing) - I don't know how bit it is, but I'll take a guess it is $50 billion-ish, and I'd be surprised if I were off by more than 20% (sorry not more firm).

Finally, let's look at their actual exposure to pure CMBS Conduit deals. Since 2003, virtually every Conduit deal had an A1A tranche that was purposefully designed and pre-sold to one of the Agencies. Guess how many deals Freddie/Fannie bought virtually all of the multifamily exposure (approximately 16% of the total deal size) from? 221 deals worth $562 billion dollars!

The current outstanding balance of the A1A bonds on their balance sheets is approximately $75 billion (the factor is just 0.90838 because most of the underlying loans have not started to mature yet). In all fairness, the A1A does have a 30% subordination, giving them additional protection as well.

The Enterprises were part of the problem. They deserve no slack, and you especially can't congratulate them for "avoiding" the problems with the CMBS multifamily mortgages, when they were the only two companies investing in them!

Cap Rates Fall Across the Board

CREConsole has a full update, but here it is graphically:


Sunday, September 12, 2010

NCREIF Cap Rate to Treasury Spread Update

This is a little "last week", but CREConsole did provide a couple of nice graphs (from Real Capital Analytics) to accompany the Bloomy article that was arguing Cap Rates current spread to Treasurys are a sign that you should invest in CRE... I don't agree with the Bloomberg article, to be clear, but the charts are still interesting.





Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Delinquencies up 21 bps in August per Trepp

Is there any other CMBS news out there to report on?

Monday, August 23, 2010

PCV/ST Foreclosure rescheduled for September 8th

This came out Friday on BBG:
Aug. 20 (Bloomberg) -- Pershing Square Capital Management LP and Winthrop Realty Trust set a new date for a foreclosure auction on New York’s Stuyvesant Town-Peter Cooper Village after a judge halted a sale planned for next week.
The auction will take place Sept. 8, pending the resolution of a lawsuit brought by the property’s senior mortgage lenders, who object to it, according to letter filed in New York State Supreme Court today.
Pershing, led by Bill Ackman, and Winthrop had sought an Aug. 25 foreclosure auction after buying mezzanine debt on the property, Manhattan’s biggest apartment complex. Senior lenders filed a lawsuit claiming that the venture may not move to take
over the 80-acre apartment complex until the mortgage holders are paid the $3.66 billion they are owed.

Mr. Obvious hired by Fitch Ratings

Fitch reports today that European Mortgage Defaults are rising.

510 Madison trades at $1,000 psf

BXP buys from Macklowe the WSJ reports. On the one hand, that's the richest price we've seen since this little journey into the fourth circle of our own little CRE inferno, but at the same time BXP speculates in the article that Macklowe probably lost all his equity and they're basically buying the debt.

Friday, August 20, 2010

JPMCC 2010-CNTR $484.6MM

JPM just got a $484.6mm deal rated by Realpoint:

The issue is based on a single JPMorgan loan collateralized by 72 retail properties in 20 states, with tenants including The Kroger Co., Kmart, Burlington Coat Factory and Big Lots, Realpoint said. The borrower is Centro NP LLC, a unit of Centro Properties Group, a U.S. and Australian mall owner.

....

Realpoint said the issue has a loan-to-value ratio of 78.7 percent, based on the "loan cut-off balance" and an aggregate property value of $616.3 million. Its debt service coverage ratio would be 1.64 times.


--10/8/10 Updated deal name. Priced mid September, settled 9/13.

Wednesday, August 18, 2010

Bank of America, N.A. v. PSW NYC LLC

BOA sues Ackman and Winthrop for violating intercreditor agreement, calls them dirty rotten liars... Lawyers get richer, legal expense bill to Trust goes up, shortfalls coming soon.

(N.Y. Sup Ct.) Bank of America, N.A. v. PSW NYC LLC, Docket No. 651293/2010
(Aug. 18, 2010)

Balloon Defaults decline

NREI reports, that Trepp reports, that Balloon defaults are slowing. Nearly 50% of maturities paid off on time in July, versus less than 40% in June, and it is the highest percentage since 2008.

They also touch on the topic that CMBS is obviously gone in a big way, and new private lending is filling the gap - a topic frequently discussed amongst all the RE guys out there trying to reinvent themselves. They also note that most of the problems refinancing are more on the B & C assets, and that trophy assets are not having the same issues obtaining financing.

One thing that is not clear, is how harsh they were with the Balloon Default definition - for instance, if a balloon paid off 1 month after it was due, its probably not fair to count that as a balloon default if it had a material impact on the numbers. I'd probably put a 3 month band around the maturity date, perhaps even 6 in this environment. Stuff happens that slows down refis.

New Issue - DLT 2010-1 and 2010-2

DLT 2010-1 -- $94.2mm (April 2010)
DLT 2010-2 -- $26.9mm (July 2010)

Seem to be USD bonds and collateral, backed by defeased loan pools. Really don't know anything else, and just missed it whenever they got done by DB.

New Issue - JPM $1bln

Don't have the details yet, but Bloomberg states they already placed the 10yr $50mm B piece with H/2 Capital Partners for a 14% yield.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

MBIA's CMBS losses

Floyd Norris at the NYT reports:
The company said it expected to have to pay out $230 million over time on insurance for CMBS — commercial mortgage backed securities. As Rob Haines of CreditSights pointed out, the company in the past claimed that portfolio was “nearly bulletproof,” although it did cite a $123 million number three months ago. But officials then played down that number, saying they still thought the most probable result was that, in the end, there would be no losses on CMBS exposure.


And, the most laughable comment is directly out of the 10Q:
certain debt coverage ratios have deteriorated in this sector.


A few comments here. MBIA did not wrap CMBS deals. Okay, they did - they wrapped virtually every tranche of every military housing deal, they wrapped the senior tranches on 7 net lease deals between 1999 and 2005, and they wrapped a couple of foreign deals between 1994 and 2003. But that business was nothing compared to selling CDS. I assume they mostly sold CDS on A1-A4 tranches of CMBS deals, but I don't have a good way to look at their holdings. There were always rumblings about some shady dealings going on with MBIA around new issue deals back at the peak of the market, but the rumors seem to be unfounded/unproven.

So, anyone know where they keep their holdings? I don't see a 13f - do they have something similar that they have to file?

Monday, August 9, 2010

Russia - Just Like America

The top doctor in Russia stated today in the Moscow Times, "If a businessman visiting Moscow stays in a hotel, or an office, or a car, it is safe,".

It's cool, nothing to see here... oh, them, those extra dead people in Moscow, don't look at them. Look over there, ... no, not at Ozersk where the state of emergency was declared, at the big bunny, look at that bunny.

Nothing to see here, move along people...

Ackman Enters The Fray

Bloomberg reports Ackman jv'd to buy the senior most 3 mezz pieces from Peter Cooper/Stuy Town:
The joint venture paid $45 million for the senior-level mezzanine debt and began foreclosure proceedings on the property, the companies said today in a statement. Pershing Square, based in New York, owns 77.5 percent of the venture.

CRE Industry Groups remind Congress CRE maturities suck

From ZH:
The undersigned commercial real estate industry associations strongly support the Community Recovery and Enhancement Act (CRE Act), important legislation introduced by Congresswoman Shelley Berkley to help incentivize equity investment in distressed commercial real estate assets and to address the pending crisis threatening community banks that currently hold significant real estate debt on their books.

According to the February 11, 2010 report by the Congressional Oversight Panel on the Troubled Asset Relief Program, small and mid-sized banks will bear the brunt of coming losses on commercial real estate loans. The report found that nearly 3,000 banks have concentrations in commercial real estate loans, including 2,115 banks with $100 million to $1 billion in total assets. Banks hold $1.5 trillion, or 45 percent, of the $3.4 trillion of commercial real estate debt in the U.S.

We believe that the CRE Act is a thoughtful and targeted solution to the current credit crisis in commercial real estate. This legislation will enable banks to convert troubled loans into performing assets through modest tax incentives to attract new equity capital to existing commercial real estate projects. The new investments would be specifically used to pay down debt, resulting in lower loan-to-value ratios of existing loans as well as improved debt coverage ratios. Importantly, the CRE Act relies upon market factors and economic incentives, rather than direct government involvement, to determine winners and losers.

Under this temporary tax incentive proposal, qualifying investments must be made before 2013 and only applies to assets purchased before 2009. At least 80 percent of the newly invested project capital must be used to reduce the outstanding balance of debt on the asset, with the balance going toward capital improvements, such as energy efficiency enhancements or leasehold improvements to attract new tenants. The new investment would qualify for a one-time 50% bonus depreciation and investors would be able to deduct any losses associated with the qualifying investment without regard to the passive loss limitations under Section 469 of the IRS Code.

We believe that this proposal has been carefully crafted and will help rebalance the debt vs. equity equation plaguing the commercial real estate and community banking industries. By giving lenders the ability to responsibly refinance debt and rebalance capital reserve levels, the CRE Act will provide the opportunity for additional lending capacity that will help stimulate lending to small businesses, job formation and economic growth in communities across the country.

Signed,

International Council of Shopping Centers
National Multi Housing Council
National Apartment Association
National Association of Realtors®
Institute of Real Estate Management
CCIM Institute
Associated General Contractors
Society of Industrial and Office REALTORS®

Hartford Takeover Rumors...

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

FDIC looking to securitize "distressed" CRE

And there it is, RTC Part Deux, that means that all of those real estate funds that raised capital to go after distressed loans and properties are going to have to change their docs and get investor permission to buy CMBS to stay in the game... If they haven't already been shut down after running up against the end of their investment period.

GSMS 2010-C1 ($788.5mm) *UPDATED* Launch

GSMS 2010-C1

3 other tranches; 23 mortgages/48 properties; 78% retail; WAVG coupon 6.081%, 11% have additional debt. 25 & 30 Ams.
Class DBRS/Mdy Size($mm) WAL(yr) CE% Guidance Launch px/sprd
A1 AAA/Aaa $ 232.00 4.96 18.50% S+130a $103/+125
A2 AAA/Aaa $ 410.62 9.86 18.50% S+140-145 $103/+135
B AAA/Aa2 $ 27.60 9.9 15.00% S+200-225 $103/+190
C AA/A2 $ 35.48 9.9 10.50% S+275-300 $101/+265
D BBB(high)/Baa3 $ 35.48 9.9 6.00% S+375-400 WAC/+400


Announced 7/28
Guidance 7/29
Launched 8/4 - inside of guidance!
Priced 8/4 - at Launch Levels

Tuesday, August 3, 2010

Savoy Park (CSMC 2007-C1) $210mm Seeks Refi

Another deal brought to you by a jv between Apollo (AREA) and Vantage Partners... Anyway, this is another rent control story in NY. Bought it for $175mm, leveraged it up to $367.5mm with $210mm in CSMC 2007-C1, and the $157.5 remainder in B-notes and mezz.

Without even looking, you can guess that this loan is with the special, but just so you know, it's not covering with a 0.49x DSCR (NCF; senior debt) at 97% occupancy. There is a healthy reserve, but even the Realpoint spokesperson quoted in the story in yesterday's WSJ notes that it should last "about another two months".

It's due 1/11/2014

Parkus lands at Morgan Stanley

Richard Parkus, one of the few CMBS guys not to change seats over the last few years, finally jumped from Deutsche (-1) to MS (+1).

Blackstone's Property Deals

The WSJ summarizes Blackstone deals this year

  • Blackstone and Glimcher buying Pearlridge Center on Oahu for $242mm from Northwestern Mutual
  • Blackstone bought 60% stake in Glimcher's Lloyd Center (Portland) and Westshore Plaza (Tampa) in March for $60mm + debt assumption -- see here-both serve as collateral in 4 2003 deals.
  • Caruso Affiliated & TPG Capital paid $750mm for retail and mixed-use out West
  • Blackstone is buying an 80% stake in 17mm sq ft of warehouse space for $105mm + debt from an Eaton Vance Fund. Prologis is the joint owner and will keep its 20% stake.
  • Blackstone closing this week on a $500mm purchase of a portion of GGP, this week.

Monday, August 2, 2010

New Issue - Vornado $600mm+

Coming soon. Will update with details when known.

Trepp Updates July Delinquencies

Trepp reports that delinquencies are worser-er, but are getting lesser worse each month (sic), or something.

30+ Days Delinquent
July-09 - 3.71%
Jan-10 - 6.49%
Apr-10 - 8.02%
May-10 - 8.42%
Jun-10 - 8.59%
Jul-10 - 8.71%

It wasn't really written that poorly, I'm just ornery and picking on them.

FTC kicks out 3 Prime Outlets from Simon Takeover

Bodamer reports that the FTC kicked out 3 centers and reduced Simon's investment by $700mm on the Prime Outlets deal...

Securitization IS the answer after-all?

American Banker reports the FDIC sold securities backed by $471.3 million of performing single-family mortgages originated by 16 failed banks.

Monday, July 26, 2010

Realpoint Delinquency Report

As expected, delinquencies got a little worse in June (note the RP report has a typo in the first table regarding the reporting month) with 7.702% of the total CMBS universe now delinquent (versus 7.27% in May, and 6.91%). Every bucket worsened expect for 60-89 day, which decreased by 31% (only half that decrease is due to loans going into the 90+day delinquency bucket though!).

Realpoint is now looking for 11-12% delinquencies by year-end. Seems pretty rosy to me, but the year is quickly passing us by.

Total delinquency at $60.45 billion.

Special Servicing - $88.6 billion (11.29%)

Average 2009 Loss Severity - 42.1%, including fees 62% (per RP)

Surprises: Hotel Average Loss Severity 2nd lowest at just 44.1%! Even taking off the tails with <2% loss severities Hotels are just at 61.3% (the third lowest of all property types?!? preceeded by RETAIL!! and Healthcare)





There are some pretty charts in there too, and a ton of additional information. Go to realpoint.com - it's a free report.

Defaults to increase in 3rd quarter


Housingwire reports

Analysts at Deutsche Bank found that the number of new transfers into special servicing will continue to outpace commercial loan workouts. But once properties are ready for liquidation, valuations on commercial real estate are missing the mark, according to Deutsche Bank. More recent appraisals are needed on these properties to narrow the gap between liquidation expenses and proceeds.

The analysts projected an 18% delinquency rate on CMBS.


There we have it - a realistic delinquency rate - 18%. I believe that number.

If you've been watching the MSM, the WSJ, CNN, Fortune etc. all had articles over the last couple of weeks talking about the "accidental recovery in CMBS", and shiny unicorns that shit rainbows that taste like skittles, etc. etc.

I almost sold all CMBS just based on the CNN article alone - they highlight Hartford for pete's sake. You see something that rosy, written by someone who obviously knows little about the world in general and less about CMBS, highlighting "good" companies that were really the "bad" ones - well, you just have to interpret the opposite of how they intend to get anywhere close to reality.

Monday, July 19, 2010

Innkeepers

Innkeepers filed for bankruptcy, in front of looming refi problems...

Forty-four of the properties are Marriott-flagged, and they've agreed to forbear any claims so long as 23 are "improved". In addition to the senior mortgage in LBUBS 2007-C7 AND LBUBS 2007-C6, there is also a $50.7mm loan from Five Mile, and the new agreement calls for a $17mm loan to improve the Marriott properties. Equity is wiped out in the plan.

From Bloomberg:
The hotel company, laboring under $1.42 billion in debt, holds interests in 72 upscale and midprice extended-stay hotels operated under brands such as Marriott, Hyatt and Hilton. The hotels are spread across 19 states and Washington, D.C.
...
took on hundreds of millions of dollars in debt in a $1.5 billion buyout by Apollo Investment Corp. Apollo Investment, which receives advisory services from an affiliate of private-equity firm Apollo Global Management, purchased the hotel company around the top of the market in 2007. Apollo declined to comment.


and then the journalist just takes a nose dive and loses all credibility:
The loans were then carved up and sold to investors as collateralized mortgage-backed securities.


Really, he has a couple of quotes after that which might be worth reading if the C in CMBS stood for "collateralized".

Friday, July 16, 2010

BofA Hires Kok, Eyes 3-Way CMBS Offering - Commercial Mortgage Alert

That was the title to last week's CMA article - It stands on its own without further comment.

Shortfalls...

The AM and AMFX bonds on MSC 2006-IQ12 were hit with interest shortfalls last month equal to approximately 20% of the interest due, and I'm pretty sure that is a first for this high in the capital stack. IQ12 is part of CMBX.3, as well.

The shortfall is a direct result of the 912-unit, Memphis-based, New Horizon Apartments loan, which took a 100+% loss severity, wiping out all the classes up through about 1/2 of the N tranche.

Takeaways: CMBS are chunky, and you should probably review you your ISDAs this month.


Wednesday, July 7, 2010

Park Avenue Plaza trades at $570 psf

Fisher Bros. sells 49.9% to Rockpoint, 1 day after one special dealer heavily markets the associated CMBS bonds and makes clients beaucoups of money.
It's tough writing sell-side research all the time. No one really appreciates you internally, it's impossible to gauge your impact on revenues, you're underpaid, and everyone's a critic. People make mistakes too, and you have to forgive them the first time around although sometimes the forgiveness must be delivered in a very harsh shell so that the mistake is not repeated. I get all that.

That being said, Deutsche Bank's Frankfurth-based research group put out a piece on CRE yesterday title "Commercial Real Estate Loans Facing Refinancing Risks; CMBS only a part of a growing problem" that was really embarrassing for them in my opinion. The conclusions, the title, and overall gist of the paper is not incorrect - in fact, it's kind of obvious in the "duh, we have a refinancing wave coming in CRE both in the US and abroad!" kind of way. Hopefully after 3 years of this you're already familiar with the issue - probably more so than the authors at DB!

There is no flow to the paper. Its so bad that its hard to read. One paragraph is about the US, the next is Germany and the UK, and then there's something about Paris, and then you have to loop back and re-read the last three paragraphs to figure out what they're talking about. US CMBS and CMBS from the other side of the pond pretty different animals - and you can't switch back and forth between describing you're typical longer term fixed-rate US Conduit deal and a shorter term UK floating rate deal.

They go to some great lengths to compare ratios between the countries. For instance, they note that in Europe, CMBS only accounts for 8% of the CRE loans, while in the US the ratio is closer to 25%. Okay, what is that supposed to mean? Your Euro CMBS deal is full of short-term floating rate paper, your US is full of 10 year (mostly) fixed-rate paper. Your Euro CMBS loans are structured more like a US regional bank's CRE development loan than anything in the US CMBS market. They don't really come to a conclusion either way, but do infer that "risk of turbulence for CRE would be smaller than for housing" because fewer CRE loans were securitized. Also, without looking, they're estimate for the Resi market seems vastly incorrect.

Pages 5, thru 8 are just completely mind boggling. Under the section where they "define" CMBS, they start off describing a European structure and you assume they're purposefully not including US CMBS yet, then you start seeing a few references to US CMBS that don't show up in European CMBS, and you realize they've just mixed and matched the two as if they were that similar. Somewhere on page 6 it just leaves the realm of reality and I switched from reading to scanning.

Then there are sections just begging for some actual "out-loud thinking" on their part. On page 10 they discuss how 53% of US CMBS maturities in 2010 have extension options, but that percentage drops to 10-14% the subsequent two years. Do you want to know why? Well don't bother looking in the report. Maybe its obvious (it is to me), but I'm guessing if you ask the author, they won't know the answer. They come to the conclusion that things aren't so bad in 2010 - nevermind that the rest of the CRE mortgage market (the 75% that is not CMBS) is virtually all short-term debt maturing now - not in 2016 and 2017.

So, I'll stop picking on them. This is not the worst piece I've ever read, but it does remind me of a similar article in early 2008 when Goldman's Global (non-US) desk produced a report titled "US Commercial Real Estate: High Losses, Slow Burn" that was so factually inaccurate and so obviously authored by someone with zero experience in the US CMBS market that they later had to retract and republish an addendum piece (that still was unimpressive and full of errors).

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Midtown Class A rents at $63.24 psf

*BROKER STUDLEY INC. ISSUES PRELIMINARY NYC OFFICE NUMBERS
*MIDTOWN MANHATTAN CLASS-A RENTS AVERAGE $63.24 A SQUARE FOOT
*OFFICE RENTS IN MIDTOWN NYC END STEEP DECLINE, STUDLEY REPORTS
*MANHATTAN CLASS-A OFFICE RENTS LITTLE CHANGED IN Q2: STUDLEY

Realpoint Delinquency Report


Realpoint released their delinquency report today - guess what ?!? Delinquencies increased.

They did note that their "heavily stressed scenarios" put end of year delinquencies in the 11% to 12% range - this is similar to our most-likely-and-definitely-expect-it-to-exceed-those-levels scenario.

They have several bullet points on balloon default risk - that has been the theme in the street research the last few weeks too, but I don't see what has changed in recent months. Obviously we're going to have some real balloon default risk, especially on 5 year loans from 06/07 vintages. Next year seems like the first real tough year for maturities, and 2012 is going to be a bloodbath. Deutsche Bank was out with a report on maturities too - I haven't fully digested it yet, but the initial scan showed they noted several times that CMBS is a relatively small part of the global CRE financing marketplace. Hopefully they also note somewhere how big the maturity issues are outside of CMBS, because that seems very dire starting in 2010... Especially in the US with balance sheet loans by small & regional banks.

Big picture takeaways: Hotel really can't get much worse. Optimism seems to be the generally theme. Interest in vacant retail space is up. Multifamily starting to see a hint of improvement. Office markets expected to see growth in 2011. Loss severities >1% averaged 68%.

Thursday, July 1, 2010

Second & Seneca - BACM 2007-3

Current Occupancy 70.16%, Class A & B office buildings, transferred due to WAMU vacancy (16%). Appraised $121mm on 8/31/2009.

Will update with more details when available.

Bloomberg: (no link)
The Seattle building, known as Second & Seneca, has been about 15 percent vacant since Washington Mutual Inc. left after its 2008 bankruptcy filing, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The loan was transferred to a special servicer last year to facilitate restructuring talks.
Tishman Speyer invested $15 million of new equity, according to a person with knowledge of the matter who asked not to be identified because the announcement was not yet public.
The debt restructuring “ensures that the property has sufficient capital to lease the property to stabilization and create long-term value,” said Jerry Speyer and Rob Speyer, co- chief executive officers of Tishman Speyer, in an e-mailed statement. The debt matures in 2017, according to the statement....

Tishman Speyer, based in New York, bought the property for $230 million in April 2007 and it was appraised at $125.2 million in 2009, according to King County property records. The loan was bundled into a commercial mortgage-backed security.
The property at 1191 Second Ave. includes a 436,752-square foot (40,576 square meter) Class A office tower and a four- story, 74,712-foot building and data center. The property was built in 1991. Safeco Corp., a Seattle-based home and automobile insurer, is the largest tenant.

Canyon Park - CarrAmerica Portfolios A & B

Reggie Middleton has a piece about commercial real estate on Zerohedge today, and there is a short snippet about Canyon Park that includes a PDF with pictures of the empty building (and the photographer on his bike in a few shots ;). At least some of the buildings inside Canyon Park are in the CarrAmerica Portfolios in CGCMT 2006-FL2 with a fully extended maturity date of 8/9/2011 , and one of them (Nexus - Canyon Park Laboratory -- LBUBS 2001-C3) has a 12/11/2010 ARD date.

Note the B note on the CarrAmerica loan serves as collateral in the CAN1, CAN2, and CAN3 rake legs on CGCMT 2006-Fl2.